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Abstract
This article examines mean-field games for marriage. The results support the argument that optimizing the long-term well-
being through effort and social feeling state distribution (mean-field) will help to stabilize marriage. However, if the cost of
effort is very high, the couple fluctuates in a bad feeling state or the marriage breaks down. We then examine the influence
of society on a couple using mean-field sentimental games. We show that, in mean-field equilibrium, the optimal effort is
always higher than the one-shot optimal effort. We illustrate numerically the influence of the couple’s network on their
feeling states and their well-being.
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Introduction
We look at marital interactions and relationships. Here
relationship refers to the unit (couple), rather than to the two
persons. We focus on a very ephemeral thing: what happens to the
couple as they interact over time. It is not either person, it is
something that happens when they are together, i.e., in a couple.
The couple will create something that we call a ‘‘feeling state’’ as
they talk to each other, as they smile, as they move. We model the
feeling state of a couple as a noisy differential equation influenced
by random events, parents, children, friends and the social
distribution of marital status (mean-field of states), where the term
‘‘mean-field’’ refers to the distribution of couple feeling states in
the society.
Why a mathematical model for marital interaction?
Putting the study of social relationships on mathematical footing
represents a major advance in our ability to understand and
perhaps regulate these relationships for the betterment of all
mankind [3]. The novelty of the present study inheres in the
analysis of the social distribution of feeling states (mean-field) on a
generic couple.
On the influence of couple-feeling-states in society :
Since the society, friends and parents of a couple may influence
them in an aggregative manner, a mean-field approach is suitable
for such an interaction. Here the distribution of states (mean-field)-
of all couples in the society plays an important role in the payoff
and in the effort used to maintain a marriage. Game theory is a
branch of mathematics which studies strategic interactions. Our
idea is to use mean-field games to capture the influence of society
distribution of states on a generic couple.
In their pioneering work in [3], Gottman et al. have widely
illustrated the importance of mathematical theory in the field of
marital research. In particular, they have shown that mathematical
models help us to better understand the sentimental dynamics and
hence to propose an appropriate intervention or therapy for a
couple. The authors have developed a model to analyze marital
instability, by calibrating a system of difference equations for the
evolution of partners’ emotions during a conversation. The
interaction dynamics is described by a function of experience
and whose intuitive understanding of the influence among
partners during conflict. More recently, Rey [4] formulated the
sentimental relationship of a couple as an optimal control
problem. A state variable monitors the wellness of the relationship
whose natural decay in time must be counteracted with effort
according to a widely accepted principle in marital psychology.
Stationary sentimental steady states are examined in [4,5] the
context of infinite horizon discounted optimal control problems.
None of these previous works considered the influence of model
uncertainty, noise, random events, and the social distribution of
states (mean field). In this work we examine these important issues.
This paper has three main features:
(i) We introduce stochastic optimal control in marital interac-
tion. We explicitly characterize the optimality equations
under random fluctuations which comes from model
uncertainty in the drift function of the feeling state.
(ii) We examine the impact of mean-field and effort in the
feeling state of the couple.
(iii) We propose a mean-field game model for marriage in a non-
linear setup where generically two stable states (divorce and
marriage) are observed. We study the impact of the network
of couples on the feeling state. We show that, in mean-field
equilibrium, the optimal effort of the mean-field sentimental
game is always higher than the one-shot optimal effort if the
social contribution is controlled.
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mathematical methodology can be applied to other
situations such as a society’s ecological or smoking
behavior. To the best our knowledge this is the first attempt to
   While the study here focuses on marital interaction, the
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section we present a generic model of sentimental dynamics
examining both controlled and uncontrolled situations. After that
we introduce mean-field sentimental games. Then, we analyze the
optimal behavior and mean-field sentimental equilibria with and
without noise. As an illustration we examine an interesting
sentimental dynamics wherein marriage and divorce can be seen
as ‘‘stable’’ steady states. Adding strategic effort behavior into such
couple dynamics can change the long-term behavior of their
feeling state if the system is uncontrolled.
Model and Methods
We first present a basic mathematical framework for feeling
state and well-being of a couple. We will explain below how the
model can be modified to include the (positive or negative) impact
of the society (and the ‘‘social pressure’’) on a generic couple. We
describe the sentimental dynamics, define the payoff functional for
the marital interaction and state the optimal control problem.
Governing Feeling State Equation
The feeling state (feeling level) x of the couple is modeled as an
Itoˆ’s stochastic differential equation:
dx~f (x,e)dtzsdB(t), for t[½0,T , ð1Þ
where f (x,e)~{h(x)zae, aw0 represents the expected variation
of the feeling in a short time window, s§0, h is smooth and goes
to infinity with x: B(t) is a standard Brownian motion. The effort
function e(t) can be controlled by the couple. The sentimental
dynamics is expected to start at a high feeling level x0 greater than
x where x is a certain threshold value below which the relationship
of the couple is not considered as satisfactory. The parameter a
represents the efficiency of the effort.
Remark 1 The deterministic part of the governing feeling state is an
experimental derivation from marital studies [3–5]. However, here, the
function h is not necessarily monotone in x: We introduce a stochastic term into
the sentimental dynamics of the existing literature [3–5] for multiple reasons:
(1) shocks, (2) random events in the social network of the couple may affect the
couple, (3) the drift funtion f may not be perfectly known. We add an
uncertainty term into it.
Remark 2 If the marriage starts with a feeling level x0 and is stopped at
the first time that x(t) is below a certain threshold x{E or one of the couple
member dies (life expectancy is set to T0~100 years) then the length of the
horizon is expected to be finite. This is why we consider a finite horizon
problem. Let Tdivorce~ infftw0D x(t)ƒx{eg, one can take
T~min (T0,Tdivorce) which means that T is a random variable.
Setting of the Problem
Based on the feeling state and the effort, we define the payoff
functional for a couple during ½0,T , Tw0 as
Figure 1. Typical shape of the cost function.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g001
Figure 2. Typical shape of well being.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g002
Figure 3. Steady states of the uncontrolled (e~0) dynamical
system: high type society r~2:5 (one steady state).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g003
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field influence and stochastic games.
model and understand marital interactions through mean-
P(x0,e)~E g(x(T))z
ðT
0
½s(x(t)){c(e(t))dt
 
, ð2Þ
where s(x(t)) represents the well-being of the couple at state x(t)
and c(e(t)) is the cost associated to the effort e(t): The
instantaneous payoff captures the risk at time t but we have
limited our analysis to the long-term risk-neutral setup. More
details on risk-sensitive mean-field type control and games can be
found in [8,9].
We define a couple as a union of two adult persons having
certain emotional and physical interactions, and living together.
We define family as the direct ascendants and the direct
descendants of the conjoint. In this sense, we read the quantity
g(x(T)) as the heritage that the couple bequeaths to the family in
terms of well-being. This heritage will influence the next
generation sentimental game. It is reasonable to assume that the
function g increases with the feeling state and g’(x)§0.
The function s is the well-being function of the couple. It
depends on the feeling state x in the sense that, the higher the
feeling state, the more joyful the couple. The implicit purpose of
the control problem is to increase well-being while taking into
consideration the cost. Thispurpose achieved by expanding the
feeling state above a certain satisfactory level.
Contrastingly, couples with low feeling state are more or less
happy and have the tendency to seize again. This tendency is
expressed by taking actions; caring for children, giving gifts,
cooking special meals, making concessions, in short, handling the
couple according to his or her expectation. We define the effort as
a constructive action from one conjoint to the other conjoint. It
might be useful for the reader to notice that our definition of effort
does not take into account counterproductive actions. For
example, knowing that Juliette does not like football, it is negative
that Romeo takes her to the Camp Nou Stadium for FC Barcelona
vs Milan AC making her miss her preferred telenovella movies.
The cost of effort can represent the psychological, financial and/or
emotional load provided by the couple when accomplishing this
effort. Clearly, greater effort is more expensive as it imposes a
higher cost. It is appropriate then to say that the couple
continuously provides efforts to achieve a greater well-being of
the couple itself.
We adopt the following assumptions:
N the drift function f : R?R is continuously differentiable (C1),
N the well-being function s : R?R is C1-differentiable, non-
decreasing, concave and saturated at z?:,
N the cost function c : R?R is twice continuously differentiable
(C2), non-decreasing and strictly convex.
In Figures 1–2, we illustrate the typical well-being and cost
functions.
In the next sections, we consider respectively an open-loop
control problem, an optimal feedback strategy for the couple and a
mean-field sentimental strategy.
Figure 4. Steady states of the uncontrolled (e~0) dynamical
system: low type society r~0:5 (three steady states).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g004
Figure 5. Uncontrolled sentimental dynamics without noise for
r~2:5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g005
Figure 6. Uncontrolled sentimental dynamics without noise for
r~0:75.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g006
Mean-Field Games for Marriage
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 May 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 5 | e94933
Results
Optimal Open-loop Effort Control
A control law of the form e(t)~e(t; t0,x0) for t[½t0,T ,
determined for a particular initial state value x(t0)~x0 is called
an open-loop effort. This does not depend explicitly on the state
x(t). One seeks for an optimal open loop effort strategy by
applying the maximum principle to the following problem.
(P0)
sup
(e(t))t
P(x0,e),
subject to (1) that starts at x0wxze:
8<
: ð3Þ
To do so, we use the Hamiltonian and the adjoint process. First
we analyze the deterministic case (s~0) and then the open-loop
noisy case.
Figure 7. Noisy sentimental dynamics without control for r~2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g007
Figure 8. Noisy sentimental dynamics without control for r~0:5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g008
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Figure 9. Deterministic sentimental dynamics with control for r~3:5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g009
Figure 10. Deterministic sentimental dynamics with control for r~0:6.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g010
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Figure 11. Stochastic feeling state with control for r~2:5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g011
Figure 12. Stochastic feeling state with control for r~0:5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g012
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Deterministic Open-loop optimal effort.When s~0, the
Hamiltonian is
H0(x,p,e)~f (x,e)pzs(x){c(e): ð4Þ
A maximizer of H0(x,p,e) with the respect to the effort provides
an open-loop optimal control associated with the co-state (adjoint)
process p.
The adjoint process of the optimal control is
pt~{H0,xdt~({pfx{s’(x))dt, ð5Þ
with p(T)~g’(xT ). Note that H0 is strictly concave in e. For
concave function, the first order optimality condition is also a
sufficient condition for interior point. The (interior) effort should
satisfies c’(e)~ap§0: The positivity constraint of the effort
suggests p§0 and then there is a unique solution.
The open-loop optimal control system via Pontryagin maxi-
mum principle [7] yields:
e(t)~max (0,(c’){1½ap(t)),
_p(t)~(p(t)h’(x(t)){s’(x(t))),
_x(t)~{h(x(t))zmax (0,a(c’){1½ap(t)),
x(0)~x0, p(T)~g’(xT ):
8>><
>>:
ð6Þ
By differentiating e(t) and combining with the above system,
we arrive at
_e~
1
c’’(e)
c’(e)h’(x){as’(x)½  fe(t)§0g: ð7Þ
Hence, one gets the following dynamical system between the
optimal control and the optimal feeling:
x(0)~x0,
_x~{h(x)zae,
_e~ 1
c’’(e) c’(e)h’(x){as’(x)½  fe(t)§0g,
e(T)~max 0,(c’){1½ag’(x(T)) :
8>>><
>>:
ð8Þ
Our first question is about the well-posedness of the above
system (8). Our goal is to provide a sufficiency condition for
existence of a solution. We use fixed-point theorem to establish
existence under the above assumptions. Since the functions s and h
are C1-differentiable and the strictly convex function c is C2-
differentiable, (8) admits a local solution. Next we use a stochastic
maximum principle approach to analyze the case where s is
nonzero, i.e., the stochastic case.
Stochastic optimal open-loop effort. Following the sto-
chastic maximum principle technique, the adjoint processes for
constant variance coefficient yields
Figure 13. Open-loop optimal control system with high type r~2:5 as a function of time.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g013
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Figure 14. Open-loop optimal control system with low type r~0:4 as a function of time.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g014
Figure 15. Vector field state versus effort for high type r~2:5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g015
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dp(t)~({p(t)fx{s’(x(t)))dtzqdB(t)
with p(T)~g’(x(T)),
ð9Þ
where q is the adjoint variable associated with the diffusion term.
Let ~c be the Legendre-Fenchel transform of c :
~c(ap(t))~ sup
e
ap(t):e{c(e)f g: ð10Þ
It is well known that ~c(ap(t)) is convex in p(t). Furthermore, the
optimal control is given by
e(t)~max (0,~c0(ap(t))): ð11Þ
Using Ito’s calculus, the Euler-Lagrange system is given by
x(0)~x0,
dx(t)~({h(x(t))zae(t))dtzsdB(t),
de(t)~ ~c’’(c’(e(t))) c’(e(t))h’(x(t)){as’(x(t))ð Þ½
z q
2
2
a2~c’’’(c(e(t)))
i
dtz~c’’(c’(e(t)))aqdB(t),
e(T)~max 0,(c’){1½ag’(x(T)) :
8>>>><
>>>>:
ð12Þ
A sufficiency condition for existence of solution (x(t),e(t)) is the
uniformly Lipschitz with respect to (x,e) of the coefficient
functions and uniformly Lipschitz condition for (c’){1 over the
horizon ½0,T :
Optimal Feedback Effort Strategy for the Couple
A feedback effort law is of the form e(t,x(t),t0,x0), t[½t0,T , i.e.,
the effort depends on time t, feeling x(t) and possibly the initial
conditions. Our motivation for feedback strategy comes from the
following result from Jackson (1957), page 79: ‘‘A family interaction is
a closed information system in which the variation in outputs or behavior are
feedback in order to correct the system’s response’’. This idea was re-used in
the book [3] entitled ‘‘The Mathematics of Marriage’’. The pay-off
functional is written as
Figure 16. Vector field state versus effort for low type r~0:1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g016
Figure 17. Open-loop stochastic optimal control system for a
low type.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g017
Mean-Field Games for Marriage
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 May 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 5 | e94933
Pclosed(x,e)
~E g(x(T))z
ðT
t
s(x(t’)){c(e(t’))½ dt’ D x(t)~x
 
:
ð13Þ
To find the optimal feedback control e(t,x), we use dynamic
programming. Let v(t,x) be the value starting from x at time t, i.e.,
(P1)
v(t,x)~ sup
e(t,:)§0
P(x,e),
subject to the feeling state dynamics (1):
(
ð14Þ
Figure 18. The optimal strategy provided by a couple in a high type society r~2:4.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g018
Figure 19. The optimal effort strategy of a couple in a low type society r~0:5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g019
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The Hamiltonian is given by
H(x,p)~{h(x)pzs(x)z~c(ap): ð15Þ
Since ~c(ap) is convex p we deduce that H is convex in p. It is
well known that, if there exists a twice continuous differentiable
function v(t,x) solution of
vt{h(x)vxzs(x)z~c(avx)z
s2
2
vxx~0
with v(T ,x)~g(x),
(
ð16Þ
then the stochastic optimal control effort is
e(t,x)~max 0,~c0(avx)ð Þ: ð17Þ
Under the assumptions on c,h,s,g and given x0 and the strictly
concavity of the payoff function in e implies that there is a unique
optimal control. Thus, the existence of the value follows.
Mean Field Sentimental Games
There is a significant consensus around the idea that the society
state (particularly the feeling states of the friends, parents, friends’
of friends and social environment) may influence the status of the
couple. For example, if many of the friends are in lower feeling
Figure 20. Low type: Evolution of mean-field starting from Gaussian concentrated at x~6 with standard deviation 1.5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g020
Figure 21. Low type: Evolution of mean-field starting frommixture Gaussian concentrated at x~3 and x~6with standard deviation
1.5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g021
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states, their divorce can be contagious. Moreover, a couple’s
tendency to divorce depends not just on their friends’ divorce
status, but also extends to their friend’s friends and so on. Thus we
must consider the distribution of states within the entire society,
i.e., the mean-field of states. Previous works neglected the
influence of society and the couple’s network [4,5]. In this paper,
we take into consideration the mean-field state of the society in the
sentimental dynamics of the couple. This leads to a mean-field
sentimental game.
Roughly speaking, we introduce a society’s social influences
(mean-field) and external shocks into the marital interaction
model. To do this, we assume that the function h has the form
h^(x(t),m(t)) where m(t,:) is the distribution of states of all couples
in the society at time t. Based on the model (1), we state that the
feeling state (feeling level) x(t) of the couple is modeled as a
McKean-Vlasov Itoˆ’s stochastic differential equation:
dx(t)~ {h^(x(t),m(t))zae(t)
h i
dtzsdB(t): ð18Þ
where m is the equilibrium distribution of states.
In this sequel the long-term payoff of a generic couple is written
as
Pfield(x0,m
,e)~E g(x(T))z
ðT
0
s^(x(t),m(t)){c(e(t))½ dt
 
: ð19Þ
The objective of each generic couple is to maximize its long-
term payoff through the mean-field fixed-point problem:
(P2)
sup
(e(t))t
Pfield(x0,m
,e),
subject to the feeling state dynamics (18):
8<
: ð20Þ
The happiness function s^ covers the well-being of the couple
and the satisfaction of its network. It is natural that the happiness
distribution over the network is concentrated in the family set. It is
also known that the social network may contribute to enhance the
well-being of the couple.
Mean-field sentimental equilibria. We define a mean-field
sentimental equilibrium as a (Nash/Wardrop) equilibrium of the
mean-field sentimental game. A mean-field sentimental equilibri-
um in feedback strategies is a situation in which no couple has
incentive to move unilaterally from its effort feedback strategy.
Following [6], the mean-field equilibria are solution of the
following backward-forward system for (t,x)[½0,T |R is
Figure 22. Mean-field equilibrium: the unnormalized distribution is concentrated at the two extreme boundaries.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933.g022
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vt{h^(x,m)vxzs^(x,m)z~c(avx)z
s2
2
vxx~0,
mtzLx {mh^zam~c0 avx)ð Þ
h i
{ s
2
2
mxx~0,
m(t~0,x)~m0(x) for x[R,
v(t~T ,x)~vT (x)~g(x) for x[R:
8>>>><
>>>>:
ð21Þ
Under the above assumptions on h^, s^, c and the set of effort
strategies, the mean-field sentimental game has an equilibrium.
Result 1 Asssume that the contribution of the mean-field to the feeling
state of a generic couple is small. Then, the optimal level of effort for a long-
term viability of the couple (during their lifetime) which keeps a happy
relationship going is always greater than the effort level that would be chosen in
a one-shot, i.e., e(t,x)§e, where c’(e)~0.
By assumption, the functions c’ and g are non-decreasing, and
the term h2(m) has only small influence in the drift. By small
influence of h2(m) we mean that the uncontrolled system leads to a
divorce or fluctuate feeling state if no effort is injected. The
optimality equation (21) and the strict convexity of the cost c gives
c’(e)~0ƒavx(t,x)~c’(e(t,x)): This means that c’(e)ƒc’(e(t,x)):
Using the inverse function (c’){1, one gets eƒe(t,x) and there
are several time t[½0,T  for which eve(t,x):.
Open-loop sentimental equilibria. In this section, we
analyze the influence of the society state (mean field) on the
couple. Besides, we assume that the functional h^, s^ and c^ take on
the following forms:
h^(x,m)~h(x){h2(m), s^(x,m)~s(x)zs2(m),
where s2 and h2 are smooth functionals of the mean-field
distribution. Next we present two important results on the
contagion of divorce.
Result 2 In a short horizon, Breaking Up is Hard to Do, Unless
Everyone Else is Doing it Too.
Consider a society where the majority of marriages are stable.
This means that both m(t) and h2(m(t))§0 are high enough
compared to x Thanks to the contribution of h2 in the feeling state
dynamics, the generic dynamics given in (18) has an higher value.
The more the value of h2 is, the more the feeling state will be. This
means that x(t,m(t)) will go to a higher state than the case without
mean field. Thus, Breaking Up is Hard to Do in a short horizon
even if there is no effort from the couple.
Remark 3 (Societal benefit!) If h2(m(t))ww0 then the
marriage remains maintained over time even if the couple effort is minimal.
This is because the mean-field contribution plays the role of a positive effort.
The network of the couple is having a big positive influence on their feeling state.
Result 3 If the mean-field has a tendency to the divorce states then, there
is a contagious phenomenon for divorce, i.e., starting from x0[(0,2) the couple
state will degrade due to the influence of the mean-field toward a negative
feeling state. In particular, Breaking Up is not seen as a negative thing in that
society because the majority is Doing it Too. Furthermore, stabilizing a
marriage will require more effort, and hence it will be more expensive.
Let h2(m(t))vv0: The mean-field is concentrated to negative
values below the divorce threshold range. The majority has a
tendency to the divorce. Thus, the feeling state of a generic couple
goes towards to negative values if no effort is made. A high effort is
required to bring back and maintain the feeling state to a
satisfactory one. The threshold effort e(t) to balance is
h(x(t)){h2(m(t))
a
w0 which requires some time and cost. In this
configuration, a divorce is not seen a negative thing by the society
because the majority of the society is in a divorced state. The
negative term from the society will required more effort (and hence
more cost) for the stabilization of a marriage.
Social Welfare
In this section we aim to maximize the social welfare. It consists
to solve the following mean-field control problem:
(P3)
sup
e(:)
Psocial(m0,m,e),
subject to the feeling state dynamics (18) and m(t)~L(x(t)):
8<
:
ð22Þ
where m(t)~L(x(t)) is the distribution of x(t): Note that the social
welfare problem (P3) is different than (P2) because now a control
action e affects immediately the distribution m
Psocial(m0,m,e)
~E g^(x(T),m(T))z
ðT
0
s^(x(t),m(t)){c(e(t))½ dt
 
:
ð23Þ
Define the function H^(x,m,p,q)~s^(x,m){c(e)zfpzsq: The
stochastic maximum principle of mean-field type yields
dp~{½H^x(x,m,p,q)zEH^x,m(x,m,p,q)dtzqdB
where e is the maximizer of H^: Note that the impact of the
society on the functions s^,h^ and g^ one gets the same optimality
equations as above. However, the presence of the mean-field term
m changes drastically the behavior of the adjoint process p:
Discussions: Illustrative Model of Marriage
In this section we present a mathematical model of marriage for
a specific functional h in (1). In fact, we study the dynamics
introduced in the ‘‘Mathematics of marriage’’ book [3] in which
we take into consideration a control term ae and a noise term. The
dynamical system in the case where
h(x)~rx{b: tanh (cx), ð24Þ
is written as
dx(t)~({rx(t)zb: tanh (cx(t))zae(t))dtzsdB(t), ð25Þ
with r,a,b,cw0. The choice of the function
tanh (x)~ exp (x){ exp ({x)
exp (x)z exp ({x)
in (24) is widely justified in the ‘‘Math-
ematics of marriage’’ [3] as well as in evolutionary game theory [1]
as a resulting from the imitative logit dynamics (see [2]). The
model is widely supported by many psychologist and sociologist
authors (see [3]). Note that the function h defined at (24) does not
belong to the class of functions studied in [4].
We choose b~c~1. Then, the sentimental dynamics with noise
becomes
dx(t)~½{rx(t)z tanh (x(t))zae(t)dtzsdB(t), ð26Þ
where the effort e(t)§0 is a control variable. The parameter rw0
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refers to the type of the society where the couple lives. We also
perform numerical examples to illustrate the effectiveness of the
theoretical results. To do this, let consider the mathematical model
(1) with h defined in (24). The cost and the well-being functionals
are chosen as
c(e)~
1
2
e2 and s(x)~s{10 exp ({x) with s§10:
It is worth noticing that the above choices of c and s ensure the
existence of solutions for the problems (8), (12) (17) and (21).
Steady States of the Sentimental Dynamics
According to the type of the society, we analyze the
uncontrolled (e~0) sentimental dynamics.
In a high type society (r§1). For r§1 the uncontrolled
system (e~0) converges to zero independently of the starting
point. This can be interpreted as if the couple feeling state will
degrade over time if there is no effort. The uncontrolled feeling
state has only one steady state which is illustrated in Figure 3.
In a low type society (rv1). The degradation rate is less
aggregative. We observe that in a society of low type, the
uncontrolled system (e~0) has three steady states. Two of them
are stable and one is unstable. The unstable feeling state is the state
x~0 because the derivative at 0 is 1{rw0. The another two
steady states are symmetric with respect to the origin. The one
positive can be seen as if the marriage stays for life. A negative
steady state characterizes a divorce situation. The two non-zero
states are stable. Indeed, the derivative at the steady points can be
written as {rz(1{ tanh2 (x))~1{r{(rx)2 which is negative
when rx is near{1 or 1: In figure 4 we illustrate the zeros of the
drift function {rxz tanh (x) for different values of the societal
parameter r.
Evolution of Uncontrolled Feeling States
Here, we show the societal influence on the sentimental
dynamics of a couple without effort (e~0). In this case, we
observe the variation in time of the feeling state for the two types of
society. Numerical experiments for the deterministic (s~0)
evolution and stochastic (sw0) dynamics in high type society
(r§1) and in low type society (rv1) have been performed.
A sample of 10 non-working couples with different initial feeling
states are depicted in figure 5 and in figure 6. We observe a fast
convergence to the state 0 in the high type case (r~2:5): In the
low type case r~0:5, we observe three steady states. Two (one
positive, one negative) of them are stable states.
Stochastic Evolution
Now we introduce a noise to better capture the fluctuations
observed in real life. We observe that with a small variance s the
feeling state of the couple leads to a fluctuating trajectory around
the deterministic sentimental dynamics. However, a bigger noise
leads to two main branches and a non-zero probability to switch
from one branch to another.
Figure 7 represents the stochastic evolution of sentimental
dynamics without control for r~2. Figure 8 represents the noisy
evolution of feeling states for low type r~0:5.
Sentimental Dynamics with Effort
Interestingly, when we introduce the effort, a catastrophic
situation (starting from x0v0) can be reconstructed with effort and
stabilize to a positive feeling state. These cases are illustrated in
Figures 9 and 10 for the deterministic dynamics and in Figures 11–
12 for the stochastic dynamics. Thus, the effort plays an important
role in maintaining the marriage or the cohabitation. On the other
hand, high effort may be costly to the couple. Thus, it is crucial to
find an acceptable tradeoff.
Next we depict the dynamics driven by optimal control as a
function of time. From the open optimal control of the non-noisy
dynamics (8), we observe two different situations. Figures 13 and
14 represent the trajectories of (x(t),e(t)) for different initial
conditions for both high and low type for a~10.
Figure 15 and Figure 16 represent the vector field between
feeling state and effort of the couple for high and low type. We
observe there is an invariant set which can maintain very high
effort and high feeling state.
Stochastic Optimal Control
Figure 17 depicts the stochastic optimal control trajectories and
optimal effort. We observe that a small noise in the feeling state
may have big consequences in the optimal effort (and the cost of
effort).
Dynamic of the Optimal Feedback Effort
The experiment consists in observing a couple over a finite
horizon. We suppose that the couple finishes the horizon T with
the same heritage of feeling state whatever the initial feeling state
is. In other terms, the functional g is constant, therefore the
terminal optimal effort is zero. To describe the dynamics of the
optimal feedback strategy of such a couple, we applied an implicit
(time) backward scheme to the backward differential equation (16).
The Hamiltonian is approximated using Lax-Friedrichs approach
to preserve monotonicity, consistency and continuity properties.
Two numerical experiments are performed with respect to the
type of the society.
The couple starting with a low feeling state is to provide no
effort. For the conjoints of such couple, it is hard to resist due to
the influence of the high type society. From Figure 18, one can see
that for a couple starting with a fairly good feeling state
(xzEƒxƒxzKE) the optimal strategy is to do actions. Indeed,
the couple will break up because of the negative influence of
society and will line up with a null optimal effort. Also, we observe
the same phenomenon for a couple starting with a higher feeling
state. The optimal effort is nevertheless important because starting
at a higher feeling state can counterbalance the negative influence
of the society.
The optimal strategy for a couple starting with low feeling state
is to provide zero effort. This is not surprising since in a low type
society living, a couple follows a societal phenomenon. We can see
from Figure 19 that the optimal strategy effort for a couple starting
with high feeling state is a time-decreasing function. In that case,
doing good action is motivated more by seeking ideal happiness
than by up-holding the couple. Overall, we observe that the
optimal strategy is cheaper in a low type society than in a high type
society.
Mean Field Equilibrium Trajectories
We now address the numerical simulations for the mean-field
equilibrium (21). The functional h^ and s^ are chosen as defined in
(22), the functional h is specified in (24), the effort cost and the well
being intrinsic to the couple are given by (27).
The numerical experiment consists here in observing the
evolution of the distribution m representing the society in which
a given couple lives. For the sake of simplicity, we suppose that the
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reference couple has an almost constant optimal effort in a
particular window. This implies that the value v is linearized with
respect to x and constant in time. The numerical task is then to
compute the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation in (21). The
developed algorithm focuses on unnormalized distribution (posi-
tive measure).
Figure 20 represents the evolution of the mean-field equilibrium
with initial Gaussian distribution centered at x~6 with standard
deviation 1:5 for a low type.
When the initial distribution is a mixture of Gaussian
distributions centered at x~3 and x~6 with standard deviation
1.5, we observe in Figure 21 that the state distribution will
propagate rapidly to be concentrated at the extreme in a relatively
short time.
For the mean-field equilibrium, the symmetric steady states
observed previously in the case where the control was a constant,
are not steady state anymore because the feedback control e(t,x) is
now dynamic in state as time goes. We observe that if the initial
mean-field is a mixture of Gaussians centered at 25 and at +5
with standard deviation 0.05 then the feeling state will propagate
and will be concentrated at the two extremes at the final time
(Figure 22).
Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a mean-field game model for
marriage, cohabitation, divorce and remarriage. Our study
suggests that the optimal effort may help in sustaining marriage
and cohabitation if the cost of that effort is acceptable and the
initial couple state is not too low. This helps us to understand at
least theoretically the key processes related to marital dissolution,
co-habitation separation, stability and fluctuation. The study can
be useful to design or evaluate an adequate intervention. It also
suggests that knowing many divorced people may influence the
status of a marriage. The more divorced people you know, the
riskier your own marriage. However, a marriage doesn’t break
down just because friends are divorcing. Marital breakdown
depends on many factors including effort and mean field.
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